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I consider the role of conscription as a ﬁscal shock absorber in times of war. Conscrip-
tion of military personnel allows the ﬁscal authority to minimize wartime government
expenditure, and hence, minimize tax distortions associated with war ﬁnance. I develop
a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to articulate this view, and calibrate the
model to mimic the U.S. World War II experience. Analysis of the calibrated model
indicates that the value of conscription as a ﬁscal policy tool is quantitatively large.
1. INTRODUCTION
Conscription allows the government to ‘bypass’ the labor market in meeting its military
staﬃng needs. As a result, it allows governments to pay soldiers below market wages,
thus minimizing tax distortions associated with ﬁnancing military expenditures. In many
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1countries, conscription has been used primarily during times of major war. Conscription
was instituted during the American Civil War by both the Union and the Confederacy,
and during the U.S. involvement in World War I and World War II. Hence, given historical
practice, conscription can be viewed as a ﬁscal shock absorber, minimizing tax distortions
associated with periods of wartime spending.1
In this paper, I formulate a simple, dynamic general equilibrium model which articulates
this view. I show that conscription can be part of an optimal ﬁscal policy when an economy
is subject to stochastic episodes of war. I then calibrate this model to the U.S. WWII
experience and perform two counterfactual simulations. The ﬁrst replicates the war, but
with the government hiring an all-volunteer armed forces. The second has the government
instituting an ‘optimal’ conscription policy. These experiments allow me to quantify the
welfare value of conscription as a ﬁscal policy tool for the U.S. WWII eﬀort.
The U.S. experience represents an ideal episode with which to address this question.
Table 1 presents a comparison of selected statistics across major U.S. wars. By virtually
any measure, WWII was the largest war or military conﬂict in its history. In the peak year
of 1945, over 12 million men served on active duty in the armed forces.2 This represented
nearly 12% of the adult population and over a quarter of prime-aged American men. The
vast majority were conscripted. The ﬁrst Selective Service Act was passed in August of 1940,
and inductions began in earnest in 1941. By December of 1942, conscription became the sole
means of military recruitment. Of the 16 million men who served in WWII, approximately
10 million were conscripted, with a large proportion of the remaining men ‘draft-induced’.3
1See also the experiences of Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand during WWI and WWII. It
should be noted that after institution in 1940, the U.S. continued the practice until 1973. Hence, conscription
was used also during the peacetime episodes between WWII and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. I return
to this below.
2Sources and details on all data used in this paper are contained in Appendix A.
3Though no estimates for draft-induced volunteers exist for WWII, it is clear that this is the case.
Volunteering presented clear beneﬁts over being conscripted, including the ability to train and serve in
action with friends once enrolled. Department of Defense estimates from later periods corroborate this view.
In 1964, 38% of volunteers reported being draft-induced, while in 1970, near the height of recruitment during
the Vietnam War, 50% reported similarly.
2Enrollment Casualties Cost (2002$’s)
total per total battle deaths battle deaths total per
Conﬂict (000’s) capita per enrolled per enrolled per month (billions) capita
Revolutionary War 217 9.1% 4.9% 2.0% 44 2.2 923
Civil War 3263 13.3% 23.9% 6.6% 4478 62.0 2532
World War I 4735 5.0% 6.8% 1.1% 2811 190.6 2718
World War II 16112 15.6% 6.7% 1.8% 6626 2896.3 27957
Korean War 5720 5.1% 2.8% 0.6% 910 335.9 2985
Persian Gulf War 2322 1.2% 0.1% 0.01% 148 76.1 384
Table 1. Statistics from selected U.S. wars. See Appendix A for data sources and description.
Table 1 indicates that WWII was also the most costly war in U.S. history by nearly an
order of magnitude. In 1944, government spending made up 48% of GDP; this represented
an increase of 550% in real spending relative to that of 1940. This necessitated drastic
changes in the means and extent of government revenue collection. In 1939, federal personal
and corporate income taxes totalled approximately 2.1 billion (current) dollars, or 33% of
total federal tax receipts. By 1945, these ﬁgures had increased to 34.4 billion and 76%,
respectively. Over the same period, the percentage of the labor force required to pay
income taxes increased from 7% to 81%. Given these circumstances, it is interesting to
determine the eﬀect of concurrent wartime policies on government ﬁscal policy. Of obvious
importance is the ﬁscal consequences of conscription.
This is not the ﬁrst paper to consider the economics of conscription. In the late 1960’s, a
series of important papers addressed the then current use and implementation of peacetime
conscription.4 These papers focused on its associated distortions and ineﬃciencies, eﬀects
which could be eliminated by employing an all-volunteer military. These include: the mis-
allocation of labor skill across civilian and military uses, and the distortion of incentives for
4See, for instance, Friedman (1967), Hansen and Weisbrod (1967), Oi (1967), Fisher (1969), and Amacher
et al (1973). Many of these were written in association with the Marshall Commission’s review of the
Universal Military Service and Training Act of 1951, which was due to expire in 1967.
3human capital accumulation that arise from a randomized selection process; the distortion
on education, marriage and child-bearing incentives induced by the system of deferments
and exceptions that were in place; and the obvious issues regarding equity and the infringe-
ment on individual freedom arising from mandatory service. As a summary, these papers
made a strong case for the termination of conscription in favor of a volunteer system as
means of peacetime military recruitment.5
These costs and ineﬃciencies present a trade-oﬀ to the ﬁscal beneﬁts of conscription
in determining the optimal system of military recruitment. In particular, as the size of
the required force increases, tax distortions associated with ﬁnancing a volunteer military
service are exacerbated, while some of the costs of conscription may actually decrease.6
Hence, conscription may be the preferred option when the demand for military personnel
is large. This observation is clearly exposited in Friedman (1967):
If a very large fraction ... of the relev ant age groups are required ...in the
military services, the advantages of a voluntary army become very small ...
[T]o rely on volunteers under such conditions would then require very high pay
in the armed services, and very high burdens on those who do not serve, in order
to attract a suﬃcient number into the armed services. ... [I]t might turn out
that the implicit tax of forced service is less bad than the alternative taxes that
would have to be used to ﬁnance a voluntary army. Hence for a major war, a
strong case can be made for compulsory service.7
5Conscription was indeed abandoned in the U.S. in 1973. Selective Service registration was reinstated in
1980.
6For instance, if all eligible individuals are required to serve, then issues regarding inequality and misal-
location of labor across civilian and military uses become irrelevant.
7An earlier discussion is provided by the British political economist, Henry Sidgwick (1887): “Where,
indeed, the number ... is not large ... voluntary enlistment seems clearly the most economical system;
since it tends to select the persons most likely be eﬃcient soldiers and those to whom military functions are
least distasteful; ... But a nation may unfortunately require an army so large that its ranks could not be
kept full by voluntary enlistment, except at a rate of remuneration much above that which would be paid in
other industries ... in this case the burden of the taxation requisite ... may easily be less endurable than
the burden of compulsory service."
4Recently, a number of papers have presented theoretical analysis formalizing this view
(see Garﬁnkel, 1990; Lee and McKenzie, 1992; and Ross, 1994). In addition, two of these
papers provide empirical evidence in support of this as a positive theory of conscription.
Ross (1994) presents cross-country evidence linking larger armed forces to increased reliance
on conscription, while Garﬁnkel (1990) shows in U.S. time series data that average marginal
tax rates are negatively related to the use of conscription (after controlling for government
spending).8
This paper diﬀers from the recent literature in that it does not attempt to provide a
positive theory for the use of conscription. Instead, the central objective of this paper is to
quantify the welfare value of conscription in its ﬁscal policy role during a large event such
as the U.S. WWII eﬀort. Surprisingly, this has not yet been attempted in the literature.
In the context of Friedman’s discussion, the goal is to determine ‘how strong a case can be
made’ for conscription during a major war.
In the next section I present the model. The analysis abstracts from issues such as
inequality, misallocation of labor skill, and distortions to human capital incentives; this
allows me to focus on the paper’s stated objective. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium as
well as what I refer to as an optimal conscription policy. Section 4 presents data relevant
to the quantitative exercise, as well as simulation results for the benchmark economy and
counterfactual experiments. The results indicate that the case for conscription is indeed
strong: despite the fact that the war lasted only four years, the ﬁscal value of conscription
is worth between 1% and 1.5% of consumption in perpetuity. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Let st denote the event realization at any date t,w h e r et =0 ,1,.... The history of
date-events realized up to date t is given by the history, or state, st =( s0,s 1,...,s t).T h e
8See also Mulligan and Schleifer (2004), who present an alternative positive theory of conscription based
on the ﬁxed costs associated with its administration and enforcement.
5unconditional probability of observing state st is denoted π
¡
st¢
, while the probability of









. The initial state, s0,








. The second is a shock that determines whether the economy is in a
state of war or a state of peace. Periods of war and peace diﬀer along two dimensions: (i)
the government’s demand for privately produced goods, g
¡
st¢
; and (ii) the fraction of the
population it requires serving in the armed forces, d
¡
st¢











follows a stationary, Markov processs. For simplicity, I assume that the government’s de-
mand for military personnel during peacetime is zero (d =0 ).9 This amounts to assuming
that the production technology for the government’s peacetime defense services is identical
to that for highways, dams, and privately produced output. Further, I assume that the
per-period-hours a soldier spends in active duty is given exogenously. Hence, variation in




In what follows, I ﬁr s tp r e s e n tt h ec a s ei nw h i c ha l lm i l itary personnel are conscripted.
Though during WWII the military employed a mixed conscript/volunteer force, the discus-
sion presented in Section I indicates that this simpliﬁcation is not far from actual experience.
The case of an all-volunteer military which I consider as a counterfactual is presented in a
separate subsection.
2.1 Households
The representative household in the economy is composed of a unit measure of family
members. Each family member has identical, time separable preferences over consumption
and labor, with current utility given by:
U (c,h)=u(c)+v(h),




, of these members is drafted by the government for military service. In the
9As will be shown below, this is not a bad approximation for the U.S. prior to 1941.
6military, each family member works a prespeciﬁed number of hours per period, ¯ h.G i v e n
additive separability in preferences, the household will choose to allocate the same amount
of consumption to ‘draftees’ and ‘civilians’.

















































































for all st. The initial values, k
¡
st−1¢
≡ k−1 > 0 and b
¡
st−1¢
≡ b−1 are taken as given. The




units of real, one-period bonds purchased at st−1 w h i c hm a t u r ea td a t et;n o t et h a te a c h
bond returns one unit of consumption, irrespective of the state realized at date t.T h e




is the state-contingent capital income tax rate, r
¡
st¢
is the real rental rate,
and δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate, so that θ
¡
st¢
δ is a depreciation allowance in the
tax code. The third term represents after-tax labor income earned at state st,w h e r eτ
¡
st¢
is the state-contingent labor income tax rate, w
¡
st¢




the number of hours worked by civilians. I model the military wage rate earned by draftees
as equaling a fraction, φ ≥ 0, of the civilian wage rate. This fraction is treated as a policy
variable by the government.







and non-contingent bonds. The state st consumption price of a bond which pays one unit of
consumption at all st+1 following st is denoted p
¡
st¢
. Investment augments capital holdings


















































































The ﬁrst FONC indicates that the presence of a proportional labor tax drives a wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution in (civilian) leisure-consumption and the real
wage. The second states that (future) capital taxation drives a wedge between the current
marginal value of consumption and the marginal utility weighted expectation of real capital
returns. The third states the standard pricing formula for a risk-free, one-period bond.
2.2 Firms





















denote capital and labor hired at st, respectively; γ is the deter-
ministic growth rate of labor-augmenting technology; and z
¡
st¢
is the stochastic level of
productivity.
















































The government’s payment for privately produced output, g
¡
st¢
, and conscripted labor
services, d
¡
















































for all st. Note that the government’s expenditures include only the after-tax value of
military wages. This is in keeping with U.S. policy during WWII.10
2.4 The case of an all-volunteer military
In this subsection, I characterize the case in which the government does not have the
ability to conscript. Hence, the government must pay a market determined wage to induce
the household to supply the required personnel in order to meet military demand. Given
the ﬁxity of per-period-hours each armed forces member must spend in the military, the




of its family members the household chooses to allocate to military work.




















































































for all st. Here, x
¡
st¢
is the military wage, which diﬀers from the civilian wage, w
¡
st¢
.T h i s




10Beginning with the Korean War, military pay earned in combat zones by members of the Armed Forces
was exempted from taxation. See the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, Section 112.
9The ﬁrm’s problem in this case is identical to that presented above, and the government’s
budget constraint is augmented in the obvious way to account for the fact that the military
wage is now x
¡
st¢










for all st must hold in equilibrium.
Also, from the household’s FONC with respect to e
¡
st¢
, it is easy to derive the following





































, is state-contingent (in particular, contingent on h
¡
st¢
). Moreover, we see that
conscription is a ‘special case’ of the all-volunteer case, in which the factor of proportionality,
φ, is restricted to be constant.
Finally, it is straight-forward to show the following result:






≥ 1. That is, in the case of an all-volunteer
military, the military wage rate is greater than the civilian wage rate.
See Appendix B for the proof. Hence, for φ<1, conscription always confers a cost saving
to the government in terms of military wage expenditures.
3. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND RAMSEY EQUILIBRIUM
A competitive equilibrium in the conscription economy is deﬁned in the usual way.





























































} solves the household’s problem subject to the sequence










} solves the ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s problem;
• the sequence of government budget constraints is satisﬁed;



















Bond market clearing at each state has been implicitly assumed, as both issues and holdings
are denoted by the single variable, b
¡
st¢


















A competitive equilibrium in the case without conscription is deﬁn e di na na n a l o g o u sm a n -
ner.
Following the seminal work of Lucas and Stokey (1983), I next characterize equilibrium
in the conscription economy in primal form. This is a useful ﬁrst step in deriving results on
the optimal implementation of conscription. I show that the primal representation requires
consideration of the following two constraints. The ﬁrst is the aggregate resource constraint
























The second is the implementability constraint which ensures that the government’s budget
































































},m u s t
satisfy constraints (9) and (10). Furthermore, given φ, θ
¡
s0¢










} that satisfy these constraints, it is possible to construct all of the remaining equilib-
rium allocation, price and policy variables.
The proof is contained in Appendix B. Two points warrant discussion before analyzing
optimal policy. First, a similar result to Proposition 3 holds in the case without conscription.
In particular, without conscription, the term ‘φd
¡
st¢¯ h’ in the implementability constraint,





st¢¯ h’, where ϕ
¡
st¢
is deﬁn e di n( 8 ) . 11 Second, this
economy features a complete set of tax instruments, despite the fact that the government
issues non-contingent debt. This can be seen from the primal representation, since the only
cross-state restriction on equilibrium allocations is due to the requirement of intertemporal
budget balance, (10). In this economy, complete cross-state risk-sharing is achieved through
the use of the state-contingent tax rate on capital (see Chari et. al., 1991 and 1994).
3.1 The optimal policy problem
The optimal policy problem is the following: ﬁnd the ﬁscal policy that induces competitive
equilibrium associated with the highest value of the household’s expected lifetime utility.
This equilibrium is called the Ramsey equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, the government commits to
its chosen policy at the beginning of time, and in all periods agents optimize taking this
policy as given. In light of Proposition 3, solving for the Ramsey equilibrium is equivalent









} that maximizes the household’s welfare
subject to the aggregate resource constraint, (9), and implementability constraint, (10).

















































11The details of the proof are analogous to that presented in Appendix B and left to the reader.
















In order for this problem to be interesting, it must be that a0 is suﬃciently non-negative.
To see this, note that −a0 represents the government’s initial asset position (the household’s
initial liabilities against the government). If −a0 is ‘large’, the government could ﬁnance
its stream of spending by simply running down its assets. In this case the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint would not bind, λ =0 , and there would be no need to resort
to distortionary taxation or conscription. Hence, I restrict attention to the case where a0
is suﬃciently large, so that λ>0. This amounts to restricting the initial values for the
capital tax rate, θ
¡
s0¢
, and bond holdings, b−1.
Given this characterization, it is straight-forward to determine the optimal military re-
cruitment policy.
Proposition 4 If the government’s intemporal budget constraint, (10), is binding, then all
military personnel are conscripted and paid nothing in the Ramsey equilibrium.
Proof. Let U (φ) denote the household’s expected lifetime utility in the Ramsey equilibrium














Since λ>0 and v0 < 0, U0 (φ) < 0. Hence, under conscription, welfare is maximized by
mimizing military pay and setting φ =0 . In the case without conscription, the proportion-
ality factor φ is replaced by ϕ
¡
st¢
. But since ϕ
¡
st¢
≥ 1 (see Proposition 1), welfare in this
case is always lower than in the case with conscription.
The intuition for this result is obvious. Since in any competitive equilibrium military
s e r v i c em u s tb ef u l ﬁlled, it is optimal to minimize military pay in order to minimize the
tax distortions associated with ﬁnancing it. In the model presented here, military service
13is required only in times of war. Hence, it the context of this model, conscription acts as a
ﬁscal shock absorber, minimizing tax distortions associated with wartime spending.
4 .T H EW E L F A R EV A L U EO FC O N S C R I P T I O N
In this section, I calibrate the model of Section 2 to study the US WWII experience.
















}, to match historical
observation. With this calibrated model as a benchmark, I conduct two counterfactual
simulations of the WWII eﬀort; the ﬁrst with an optimal conscription (i.e., with φ =0 )










experiments allow me to quantify the ﬁscal value of conscription.
4.1 Data description
I begin with a description of the data relevant for this exercise. Further detail and source
information is contained in Appendix A. Figure 1, panel A plots the ratio of total (federal,
state, and local) government spending to GDP, 1929-68. In addition to WWII this period
is marked by two shifts in the ‘size of government’, the ﬁrst coinciding with the election of
FDR, the second with the onset of the Cold War. During the 1933-9 and 1946-50 periods,
government spending averaged 15.6% of GDP. In the build-up year of 1941, the government’s
share increased to 21% when real total spending increased 66% — and military equipment
spending increased 16-fold — over the previous year, due to the passing of Lend-Lease and
overall military mobilization. With the onset of the war, real government spending increased
each year until it peaked in 1944 at 48% of GDP.
Panel B displays similar dynamics for the number of active duty military personnel,
normalized by the adult population. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939,
the U.S. military employed 330,000 men, roughly the same size as the forces of Portugal or
Romania, and 1/10 that of Germany (see Cardozier, 1995). Prior to this, approximately
140.3% of the U.S. population served in active duty. With the passing of the Selective Service
Act of 1940, inductions began in earnest so that by 1941, 1.8 million men representing
1.8% of the population was serving in the military. Conscription became the sole means
of recruitment in December 1942, and by 1945, the armed forces peaked at 12.1 million
men or 11.5% of the population. In 1946 conscription was terminated, military strength
dropped, and leading up to the Korean War active duty personnel numbered approximately
1.5 million annually.
As described by Ohanian (1997) and many others, the war eﬀort was largely deﬁcit
ﬁnanced allowing tax distortions to be smoothed forward in time. Panel C displays average
marginal labor and capital income tax rates as constructed by Joines (1981). Both tax
rates increased dramatically during the war. Between 1940 and 1945, the average labor
tax rate increased from 9.1% to 19.7%, and the capital tax from 45.1% to 62.9%.T h e s e
increases did not nearly cover the increased spending. Panel D displays Seater’s (1981) data
for the market value of outstanding total government debt, as a ratio of GDP. Government
indebtedness increased throughout the war until it peaked at 108% of GDP in 1945. After
the war, the debt was gradually paid oﬀ as taxes — and in particular, the labor tax rate —
remained high.
Finally, Figure 2 displays two measures of private sector total factor productivity. The
ﬁrst is from Kendrick’s seminal (1961) treatment, and the second is from Christensen and
Jorgenson (1995). Both series have been detrended by a constant annual growth rate and
normalized to unity in 1940. These data reveal three notable features. First, in both series,
the pre- and post-WWII periods are well characterized as displaying a common trend in
annual TFP growth. In the 1946-68 period (detrended) TFP ﬂuctuates around zero growth,
while in the 1929-41 period TFP falls precipitously at the onset of the Great Depression,
but grows rapidly beginning in 1934 to return to its 1929 level. The second thing to note
is that across the pre- and post-war periods, there is a marked break in levels, indicating a
‘permanent’ TFP increase. Finally, during WWII productivity displays a pronounced hump
relative to the pre- and post-war periods, peaking in 1945.
A number of recent papers address these productivity observations. Important consid-
15erations include the implementation of important product and process innovations during
the 1930s (see Field, 2003), the accumulation of road and highway infrastructure during the
pre- and post-war periods (Field, 2003), and the provision of government-owned-privately-
operated capital during the war (see Gordon, 1969; Braun and McGrattan, 1993; McGrattan
and Ohanian, 2003). It should also be noted that while the productivity series have been
constructed to account for changes in factor input composition, changes in utilization have
not been accounted for. Hence, variation in workweek and labor eﬀo r tt h a tw e r eo p e r a t i v e
(almost certainly, during the initial depression years and during the war) appear in these
TFP series.12 To keep the policy analysis tractable these technology, government policy,
and utilization considerations have been excluded from the model of Section 2. Variation








For the numerical experiments, the period length is taken to be a year. Preferences are
speciﬁed as u(c)=l o g( c) and v(h)=ψlog(1 − h). I take the exogenous growth rate of
productivity to be γ =0 .02 (see Kendrick, 1961; Field, 2003; and Cole and Ohanian, 2004).
The values for β =0 .95 and α =0 .36 are standard in the literature. As in McGrattan
and Ohanian (2003), the depreciation rate is set to δ =0 .07. The peacetime steady-state
is speciﬁed such that dss =0 , gss/yss =0 .155, τss =0 .085,a n dθss =0 .445. The latter two
values match the average values observed during 1936-40, while the former two values match
the observations discussed above. The value of ψ is set so that in the peacetime steady-
state nss =0 .27. The model produces predictions for the dynamics of government debt
accumulation. Because of this, I introduce a lump-sum tax/transfer into the household and
government budget constraints, solely for calibration purposes. This tax/transfer is speciﬁed
as a constant (i.e. non-varying, non-state-contingent) value so that in the peacetime steady-
12Note also that the presence of time-varying monopoly mark-ups aﬀects the interpretation of TFP mea-
surement. See Cole and Ohanian (2004) for a discussion of cartelization and unionization and New Deal
policies during the recovery phase of the depression.
16state pssbss/yss =0 .48.









}, as following a 6-state Markov















=0 .92 and z
¡
st¢
=1 .08. This matches the average values of detrended TFP during
the 1929-40 and 1946-68 periods, respectively, in the Christensen and Jorgenson (1995)
data, displayed as dashed lines in Figure 2. The transition state is speciﬁed to represent the
build-up year of 1941. The three war states represent the ﬁrst year (1942), the peak years










) are speciﬁed as follows. The values for d
¡
st¢
are set to match the active duty







jointly match the observations for the government spending to GDP ratio of Figure 1, panel
A and Kendrick’s (1961) measure of civilian hours worked, which is displayed below. The
transition probabilities between states are set in an analogous manner to McGrattan and
Ohanian (2003). In their paper, McGrattan and Ohanian demonstrate that a reasonably
speciﬁed, dynamic general equilibrium model is able to account for the dynamics of output,
hours worked, and the real wage observed during the 1942-50 period. Though the features
of my model diﬀer from theirs, the results presented below for the benchmark model conﬁrm
their conclusions. Details regarding the stochastic speciﬁcation are in Appendix C.
Unfortunately, data for total hours worked by the military during WWII does not exist.13
During the initial months spent in training, enlisted personnel spent approximately 54 hours
per week in drills and exercises. Once in action, oﬃcial estimates and documentation of
hours worked are no longer available. Information is available, however, from letters written
by soldiers during the war. For instance, during a typical 19-day cycle, I estimate that a
bomber pilot spent 7 days oﬀ, 8 days on-base/in brieﬁngs, 3 days ﬂying bombing missions,
13In Kendrick’s (1961) data, weekly hours worked by military personnel during the war was imputed
as being identical to those worked by civilian government employees. This obviously representes a severe
underestimate.
17a n d1d a yd e - b r i e ﬁng, totalling approximately 145 hours worked (see Parillo, 2002). Since
pilots typically worked fewer hours (in a given time period) than ground and naval personnel,
I take this to be a reasonable lower bound for combat troops. Given this, I set per period
military hours to ¯ h =0 .64, so that out of a possible 84 hours per week, 54 are spent working.
Data on total wage and salary compensation for the armed forces is available from Histor-
ical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (U.S. Department of Commerce,
1976). From this and BLS employment data, I determine that average annual earnings in
the military was 76% of that earned in the civilian economy during WWII. This also corre-
sponds with independent data available for 1945, in which the ratio of (annual) basic pay
plus allowances in the military to average earnings of non-military employees for that year
was 0.766.14 Given this, and the diﬀerence in average annual hours worked across military
and civilian sectors, I set φ =0 .63 so that in the benchmark economy, the military wage
is 63% of the civilian wage. The ﬁnal elements to be speciﬁed for the benchmark model
are the peacetime policy rules for capital and labor tax rates. I specify these rules as being
functions of the log-deviation of inherited government debt from its peacetime steady-state
value. These functions are parameterized in order to match the capital and labor tax rate
series observed between 1946 and 1949 (details are provided in Appendix C).
4.3 Simulation results for the benchmark model
Figure 3 displays time series of key macroeconomic variables for the model and the U.S.
data. The red line corresponds to the U.S. data and the blue line to the model. The model
14It should be noted that this diﬀerence in pay is unlikely to reﬂect lower labor skill among members of
the Armed Forces relative to the civilian sector. In fact, empirical evidence indicates that WWII draftees
were positively selected. Using U.S. census data, Angrist and Krueger (1994) show that favorable post-war
labor market outcomes of veterans relative to non-veterans is due to non-random selection into the miliary.
Bedard and Deschenes (2002) present evidence from the 1973 Occupational Change in a Generation Survey
for men born 1920-29. Relative to non-veterans, WWII veterans were on average from higher income families
with parents of higher educational attainment, were more likely to be urban, and less likely to be from the
South. Moreover, veterans had higher educational attainment before the war relative to the ‘ever-completed’
educational attainment of non-veterans.
18series are simulated by ‘feeding through’ exogenous shock realizations corresponding to
the historically observed WWII experience.15 Model variables are deﬁned in an analogous
manner to the U.S. data. In particular, real GDP is deﬁned as the sum of private sector








st¢¯ h; government spending

















. For all growing variables, the ﬁgure displays time series
that are detrended and normalized to unity in 1940.
Panels A and B display the government spending to GDP ratio and civilian hours worked,






have been speciﬁed so that
between 1941 and 1945, the model matches U.S. observation along these two dimensions.
Panel C displays the time series for (detrended, normalized) real GDP. The model does a
very good job of mimicking the output boom associated with the U.S. war eﬀort.16 However,
the model is slightly less successful at accounting for the U.S. economy’s strong performance
in the two years immediately following the war. This is mirrored by the model’s simulated
prediction for civilian hours worked during 1946-7. This drop-oﬀ in hours worked is due
principally to the post-war drop-oﬀ in productivity, z
¡
st¢
, and hence, return to working;
the return to working is further suppressed by the high labor tax rate which persisted after
the war, and the running-down of the capital stock which occurred during the war. Taken
together, these simulation results suggest that the U.S. WWII ‘miracle’ was not necessarily
the economy’s ability to mobilize during the war, but the economy’s strong performance
immediately afterward.
Panel D displays the after-tax real wage rate; the U.S. data corresponds to the non-farm
hourly compensation series constructed by McGrattan and Ohanian (2003). Though the
15Speciﬁcally, the economy starts in 1940 in the low-productivity-peace state. In 1941 it enters into the
build-up state, and from 1942 through 1945 it progresses through the corresponding war states. Beginning in
1946 the economy enters into the high-productivity-peace state. For the purpose of the welfare calculations
below, I continue the simulation in this state until all detrended variables converge to a steady-state.
16This close correspondence — as well as that for the consumption-output ratio, investment-output ra-
tio, and after-tax real wages — corroborates McGrattan and Ohanian’s (2003) view that variants of the
neoclassical growth model are able to quantitatively account for the eﬀects of large ﬁscal shocks.
19exact timing in the model is shifted forward by one period, this ﬁgure indicates that the
benchmark model is able to replicate the historical experience for hours worked without
predicting counterfactually large wartime gains in productivity and the return to work.




is 1.15, which is well within the range of data in Figure 2.
Panels E and F display the capital and labor tax rates, respectively. As discussed above,
the model has been speciﬁed to match the U.S. 1941-9 data.17 D e s p i t et h ec l o s ep o s t - w a r
correspondence in tax rates between model and data, the model does less well at matching
the post-war dynamics of government indebtedness, shown in panel G. That is, while the
model is able to match the market value of outstanding debt to GDP ratio observed in 1945,
this ratio increases again in 1946 in the model, while it decreases in the data. This is due
partly to the fact that the model over-predicts the fall in output immediately after the war.
Additionally, the U.S. experienced a sharp spike in inﬂation in 1946. Inspection of nominal
interest rates suggests that this inﬂation was largely unanticipated. Since bond returns were
set in nominal terms, this inﬂation resulted in an erosion of the real value of outstanding
government debt. Since the model does not allow for this type of unanticipated ‘lump-sum’
taxation via inﬂation, this also partly accounts for the discrepency between model and
data.18
The ﬁnal three panels display further successes of the model in its ability to match the
U.S. experience. Panel H displays the ratio of military wage and salary compensation
to government spending. Panels I and J display the ratios of private consumption and
investment to GDP, respectively. Again, the model does a good job of matching the U.S.
data, though it slightly overpredicts the relative fall of consumption (and underpredicts
that of investment). Taken as a whole, these results indicate that the current quantitative
17The match between model and data breaks down in 1950, since the model does not account for the onset
of the Korean War. As discussed in Ohanian (1997), tax rates (and, in particular, capital tax rates) were
increased sharply in response to the Korean War, as policy aimed to ﬁnance war spending through current
taxation.
18see also Ohanian (1998) who estimates that the post-war inﬂation amounted to a repudiation of debt
worth approximately 40% of GDP.
20model represents a good laboratory with which to study the welfare value of conscription
as ﬁscal policy.
To this end, I present two counterfactual experiments in the following subsections. The
experiments diﬀer in their speciﬁcation for tax rates in response to the counterfactual mod-
iﬁcations. For each experiment, two diﬀerent simulations are performed — one with an
all-volunteer army, and the other with an optimally implemented conscription. Together,
the two simulations provide a quantitative measure of the ﬁscal value of conscription.
4.4 Counterfactual experiments: version A
The speciﬁcation for taxes in this experiment is as follows. I keep the capital and labor tax
rates during the war at their historically observed values. After the war, I let the tax rates
follow the same policy rules used in the benchmark case. I call this experiment A.I nt h eﬁrst
simulation, I feed the WWII shock realizations through the version of the model without
conscription. Since hiring an all-volunteer military involves greater wartime expenditure
relative to the benchmark economy, this means accumulating more debt during the war.
Given the speciﬁcation of the ﬁscal rules, postwar taxes respond to the accumulated debt,
and the counterfactual economy eventually converges to the same steady-state as in the
benchmark case.
The results from this counterfactual are displayed in Figure 4. Panel A shows the diﬀer-
ence in the military pay to government spending ratios between this case (red line) and the
benchmark (blue line). As discussed, having the government hire an all-volunteer military
involves greater labor compensation relative to the historical case with conscription. In
1945, the share of government spending dedicated to military pay peaks at 37% as opposed
to 23% under conscription. The increased spending coupled with the unchanged ﬁscal policy
during the war results in greater debt accumulation in the counterfactual economy. This is
displayed in panel B. The market value of outstanding debt to GDP ratio now reaches 128%
as opposed to 108% in the benchmark economy in 1945, and peaks at 154% as opposed to
126% in 1946. As a result, the capital and labor tax rates (displayed in panels C and D)
21are higher in the years following the war until the debt level is drawn down to that of the
benchmark economy.
As a result of the higher tax rates, counterfactual postwar economic activity is depressed
as the returns to working and capital accumulation are lower. In 1946, private sector output
(panel E) in the counterfactual economy is 5% lower than in the benchmark economy, and
in 1950, output is still 3% lower.19 Indeed, civilian hours worked (panel F), private sector
output, and investment in the counterfactual simulation drop in 1945, in (probabalistic)
anticipation of the high postwar capital taxation episode.
The increased wartime spending and postwar taxation associated with the all-volunteer
military results in lost welfare relative to the benchmark case. To quantify this, I consider
the period-by-period consumption compensation that must be given to the representative
household in the counterfactual economy during its inﬁnite lifetime in order for it to be as
well oﬀ as in the benchmark. In this case, I calculate this to be a consumption increase
of 0.57% in perpetuity. However, this measure does not capture the full welfare value of
conscription. This is because in the benchmark economy, conscripted military personnel
are paid wages that are 63% of civilian wages, while it is in fact optimal to pay the military
no wages at all.
To this end, I consider a second simulation — the optimal conscription case — in which
military personnel are conscripted and paid nothing. Fiscal policy is speciﬁed as in the
ﬁrst counterfactual; that is, taxes are unchanged relative to the benchmark case during
the war, and follow the benchmark policy rules afterward. Since wartime expenditures
are minimized, this case provides a welfare gain relative to the benchmark. In particular,
lifetime consumption would need to be increased by 0.37% in the benchmark economy in
order for the household to be as well oﬀ as in the optimal conscription economy. Hence,
g i v e nt h et a xr a t es p e c i ﬁcation of experiment A, the value of conscription from a ﬁscal
perspective equals 0.94% of lifetime consumption.




, includes both private and government consumption, and private
investment. Private consumption and investment fall throughout the war.
224.5 Counterfactual experiments: version B
Experiment A understates the welfare that can be obtained in the optimal conscription
c a s e . T h i si sb e c a u s eﬁscal policy in that experiment holds wartime taxes unchanged,
regardless of the size of the military wage bill. Since military pay is zero in the optimal
conscription case, experiment A calls for an unduly large increase in tax rates during the
war years.
I consider a second experiment to address this. In experiment B, both the labor and
capital tax rates are scaled by a constant factor during the years 1942-5. This is done so
that in the ﬁnal year of the war, the ratio of the market value of government debt to GDP
is equal to 108%, the same as in the benchmark economy (and the same as that observed
in the U.S. data). Following the war, the tax rates follow the same policy rules as in the
benchmark case.
Figure 5 displays the results from simulating the all-volunteer economy in this experiment.
Again, the ratio of military pay to government spending is higher without conscription
relative to the benchmark economy. As a result of the increased military spending, both
tax rates must be increased by 18% during the war years; this is seen in panels C and D.
This has the eﬀect of depressing civilian hours worked and private sector output (panels
E and F) in each of the war years by an average of approximately 3.5% compared to the
benchmark case. As a result of the lower private sector output, the shares of output going
to consumption and investment are lower as well.
Finally, note that output in the counterfactual economy is lower than in the benchmark
economy for the years following the war as well. This is due primarily to depressed invest-
ment during the war, resulting in a lower postwar capital stock. It is also due to the slightly
higher postwar tax rates in the counterfactual economy.20 Finally, postwar hours worked
are virtually identical across the two simulations. This is because while the capital stock
20These are higher due to the higher debt levels inherited in 1946 in the counterfactual case. This occurs
despite the fact that the market value of debt to GDP ratios are the same in 1945 across the two simulations,
reﬂecting the higher equilibrium bond returns in the counterfactual economy.
23is lower in the counterfactual simulation (providing incentives for greater work eﬀort along
the transition to steady-state), the labor tax rate is simultaneously higher.
Again, the increased wartime spending associated with the all-volunteer military results
in lost welfare relative to the benchmark case, this time due primarily to the uneven distri-
bution of tax distortions across time. In order to compensate the household, consumption
would need to be increased by 0.63% in perpetuity relative to the benchmark economy.
On the other hand, under the optimal conscription simulation, wartime taxes would be de-
creased by 30% relative to the benchmark in experiment B, representing a much smoother
time proﬁle for tax rates. As a result, lifetime consumption in the benchmark economy
w o u l dn e e dt ob ei n c r e a s e db y0.98% in order to make the household as well oﬀ as in the
optimal conscription economy. Hence, under the tax policy of experiment B, the full value
of conscription is equivalent to 1.61% of lifetime consumption.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper quantiﬁes the welfare value of conscription as a ﬁscal policy tool. Conscrip-
tion allows the government to pay below-market wages to military personnel. As a result,
it allows the government to minimize wartime expenditures and their associated tax dis-
tortions. In a model calibrated to the U.S. WWII experience, I ﬁnd that the welfare gains
from instituting an optimal conscription are large. Relative to the case in which the gov-
ernment hires an all-volunteer military, the welfare gains are equivalent to between 1.0%
and 1.5% of consumption in perpetuity, depending on the exact speciﬁcation of tax rates in
the counterfactual experiment.
This is a ﬁrst step in the determination of optimal policy during a large ﬁscal event
such as the U.S. WWII eﬀort. Indeed, one possible extension is to solve for the Ramsey
optimal tax rates when the government does and does not have the ability to institute a
military conscription. Obviously, tax rates — and particularly capital tax rates — under the
Ramsey plan would diﬀer drastically from those observed historically (see Chamley, 1985;
24Judd, 1985; and Chari et. al., 1994). Along similar lines, one could consider the optimal
use of other government policy tools, such as government provision of private sector capital
(again, see Gordon, 1969; Braun and McGrattan, 1993; McGrattan and Ohanian, 2003),
price controls and rationing (a form non-linear consumption taxation which provides little
in terms of tax revenue, but much in terms of expenditure saving), and state-contingent
monetary policy (see Chari et. al., 1991; and Siu, 2004). Finally, there are many important
considerations speciﬁc to conscription that could be fruitfully incorporated into general
equilibrium analysis. These include issues such as conscription’s eﬀect on human capital
accumulation (and the potential role for education subsidies), resource misallocation, and
inequality discussed previously in the literature.
APPENDIX A
For Table 1, data for total military enrollment and casualties is from the U.S. Department
of Veterans Aﬀairs (2001). Data for war costs is from Nordhaus (2002).
The data for adult population corresponds to the total population (including armed forces
overseas), 15 years and older, July estimates; these are obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau website, www.census.gov/statab/www/minihs.html. Exceptions to this relate only
to the calculations of Table 1. For the Revolutionary War, Civil War, and Persian Gulf War,
resident (as opposed to total) population was used. For the Revolutionary War and Civil
War, resident population data are from Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial
Times to 1970 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1976), series A7, with imputations by age
using series A92-3, A99-100, A120-1 (details on imputations available from author upon
request). Historical Statistics is also the source for data on annual active duty military
personnel (series Y904), military wage and salary compensation (F167), basic pay plus
allowances in the military (D924), and average annual earnings of non-military employees
(D724).
25Total selective service inductions data are available from the U.S. Selective Service System
website, www.sss.gov/induct.htm. Data on disaggregated government spending, national
income and product accounts, and ﬁxed assets and consumer durable goods are available
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic
Accounts website, www.bea.gov/bea/dn1.htm.
Data on federal tax receipts are from the Executive Oﬃce of the President (2002). The
labor and capital income tax rates correspond to series MTRL1 and MTRK1, respectively
from Joines (1981). The market value of total outstanding government debt is the sum of
series MPRIV2, MSAVB, and MVSL from Seater (1981). The TFP measures are taken from
Kendrick (1961), Appendix A, Table A-XXII, and Christensen and Jorgenson (1995), Table
5.15, column 1. The data for civilian hours worked are from Kendrick (1961), Appendix A,
Table A-X. The after-tax real wage data are those displayed as nonfarm compensation per
hour in Figure 4 of McGrattan and Ohanian (2003).
APPENDIX B
The following is the proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. For exposition, let h ≡ h
¡
st¢
and ϕ(h) (or simply ϕ) ≡ ϕ
¡
st¢
.F i r s t ,i ti so b v i o u s
that ϕ(h)=1at h = ¯ h. It remains to show that ϕ(h) obtains a minimum at h = ¯ h.T h e
























As long as v0 (h) is ﬁnite, the only critical value for ϕ is ϕ0 (h)=0at h = ¯ h.S i n c ev0 < 0
and v00 < 0, ϕ00 ¡¯ h
¢
> 0,s ot h a tϕ reaches a minimum at h = ¯ h.
The following is the proof of Proposition 3:
26Proof. The aggregate resource constraint is obtained easily through substitution. To obtain






















} that satisfy (9) and (10), construct the remaining
equilibrium objects at st as follows. Private sector output, y
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the civilian wage rate, w
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. Using the household’s FONCs, the labor tax rate and the price of a





















To obtain real bond holdings, take the household’s date r budget constraint, multiply by






















where χ(sr)=u0 (sr)c(sr)+v0 (sr)h(sr)
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.F i n a l l y ,t h es t a t e



















































is obtained from the government’s budget constraint.
27APPENDIX C
Details regarding the stochastic speciﬁcation are available from the author upon request.
Here I discuss the key elements. The transition probabilities are chosen so that fraction of
years spent in war is 12%, the average number of wars each century is 3, and the average
duration of a war is 4 years. This speciﬁcation closely follows that of McGrattan and
Ohanian (2003). When in peace, low- and high-productivity spells are persistent, with the
probability of a transition equal to 0.3 (symmetric across states). When transitting out
of a peace state, the probability of entering directly into a war state is 0.25.O n c e i n a
non-peace state, the economy (in probability) cycles through the 1941, 1942, 1943-4, and
1945 states sequentially. When transitting from a non-peace state back to peace, I allow for
the possibility of entering the low-productivity state. Cardozier (1995) and McGrattan and
Ohanian (2003) provide Gallup poll and survey data indicating a widely held belief that
once the war was over, the economy would re-enter a depression or severe recession. Given
this evidence, I set the probability of transitting from non-peace to the low-productivity
state, given a transit, at 0.45.
The policy rules for labor and capital tax rates are speciﬁed as follows. Let ˆ xt denote
the log-deviation of the variable xt from its steady-state value xss. The policy rule for the
labor tax rate is given by: ˆ τt =0 .7ˆ bt. Given that the slope of the post-war capital tax rate
dynamics is initially increasing and then decreasing, I specify the capital tax rate rule as a
third-order function: θt = θss +0 .01ˆ bt − 0.026ˆ b2
t +0 .024ˆ b3
t.
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Figure 5. Benchmark Economy and Counterfactual Experiment B (page 2) 